Sameness (as Oneness of Differentiations)

The problem with this possibility question is similar to the problem of parts as first principles. Two separate things seem that *can’t* be same because they are separate, as sameness implies *oneness* of a thing. So sameness seems to be contradiction. Yet I myself am witness of such thing, I can see two balls and be aware that they are same.

Modeling such thing through some isolated sub-system which does comparing is not a possibility, as that wouldn’t carry apodictical necessity – we are aware of the sameness – it is sameness in the whole.

Only way through which we determine cognitive whole are differentiations. (Note: *determination* is different from *being aware of*; we can be aware of cognitive whole without doing differentiations; children for example can are aware of the some music without the possibility to determine its rhythm, melody etc…)

So if on two cognitive contexts CC_A and CC_B we *can* apply same differentiation tree – DT_X, they are implicitly determined as SAME by that DT_X.

But the notion of SAME also has implicitly in it that two cognitive contexts have to first be result of two differentiations trees (DT_A for CC_A, and DT_B for CC_B) to be first seen as something different, and that is already implicitly present in this model.

· Performing DT_Aon cognitive whole (CH) resulted with cognitive context CC_A, which after that can be further determined by DT_X.

· Performing DT_B on CH resulted with CC_B, which after that can be further determined by DT_X.

CC_A and CC_B are seen as same by DT_X, and DT_A and DT_B are not seen as belonging to the determination of CC_A and CC_B, but to their context.

Example in the above picture: In the cognitive whole there are two figures. Through differentiation tree DT_A (containing Diff₁₁) we separate context of one figure, and through DT_B (containing Diff₂₁), we abstract the context of other figure (we can’t use notions of circle or pentagon for determining the figures as such determination is not present at all in the figure). DT_A and DT_B are different. Both those figures are then determined by same DT_X, containing differentiation by color (Diff₁₂=Diff₂₂), and further differentiation of red in the context of determined color (Diff₁₃=Diff₂₃). So we can say that both figures are same by being determined as red. So… the contexts determined by DT_A and DT_Bare same by DT_X. (CC₀ is the cognitive context that is left after the DT_X, to which our will is indifferent)

Here we can see how separate things A and B can be the same thing – it is because their determination (of what they are) is the differentiation tree which is used to determine them in their containing context. So if awareness of the (one and the same) differentiation tree DT_X is held while changing the context from CC_A to CC_B the *both* different contexts are determined as *same one*. And in this model the same differentiation can be held *across* time as differentiations are not *in* time, but can be done and are done on the continuous form of time.

Such thing is possible just in model in which whole containing time on (or “in”) which differentiations are made is first principle. In a “whole exists through the parts changing in time” model (similar to computer model) where comparing would be separate to things being compared, awareness of sameness is not possible, nor “keeping” the same pattern for comparing is possible as it must be stored in some kind of memory and later retrieved. With that the apodictical necessity is gone, what is retrieved can be totally different pattern, a possible consciousness functioning that way, is unable to say that “it is aware” that two things are same.

The same differentiation can be done at two different experiences. In such way *one and the same* thing can be recognized in two different experiences. This fact along with the time as subjective form seems to me set of two things which can be used as basis for solid model of memory, which explains several possibilities. (Of course we would not go into building the whole model here, but present how these principles solve some of possibilities which are present in us)

Such model would explain why we see one thing as a same with the one we recognized before. It is because how that thing is determined (and hence what that thing is to us) and even those differentiations are done at different experiences, those are still *one and the same* differentiation, hence for us it is the same thing.

For example when we smell something, even we could have a lot of experiences from last time we smelled same thing, we think “I know that smell from somewhere.” – For us it is *the same* smell.

Having the smells in mind, it is easy to propose one other assumption about why we tend to remember the smells.

In this kind of model in which things are same not because the cognitive “input” is same but because the experience is determined as same by the same differentiations, it would implicitly follow that if we don’t change the way we differentiate, we can “remember” the same thing even it was experienced “a long time ago” (remember is here in sense that we can recognize the same thing in cognition). Given that the differentiations of smell are generally not changing in the humans, we can make an assumption that is the reason why we can remember some smell even a long time has passed.

On other hand, humans change the way they differentiate visual or auditory experience maybe as a consequence of changing body (or whatever reality “out there” is), maybe as consequence of the needs to differentiate in different ways (we will get to this need later), or maybe because of both. In such way, I as a grown up person would do a different differentiation of a cognitive context containing some person then I did as a child, hence I would not determine that person as *one and the same* - hence I can’t remember him.

It is usually seen that when we say that “A is B”- that subject A is predicate B, it means that B is set and that A is seen as element belonging to that set. So for example “red is color” would mean that there is set of colors and that red is color, by belonging to that set. But as it was noted before it wouldn’t explain, how it is possible to ask “What is that color?”, nor could such model explain why such propositions like “red is color” are apodictically true.

So here we come to other possibility question: How it is possible to have apodictically true propositions?

To answer this one we should show what concepts in our model are, and what is the nature of the proposition.