When talking about facts and more specifically about the propositions which are always true (as was “red is color”), I said that it is about the sameness of the concept of color by itself, and the concept of color as sub-tree of the concept of red.
And I said that the truth of the proposition is about the comprehension of such connection between the concepts. But something was missed, as even in the concrete situation when we have red color in our experience, we can form the concept of red directly in the experience and give judgment about it, we don’t really know “red is color” just in that specific experience. We can be aware of the relation between the two concepts even the concepts aren’t applicable on the experience.
Of course in this model such possibility is possible in principle, as once specific concept is formed as differentiation tree, it is fully determined outside of any possible experience, and hence there is possibility that it can be used even there is no experience on which it can be applied.
What is needed to add to the model is the possibility to imagine an experience on which this concept would be applicable - on which the differentiations which make up the concept can be applied, so to imagine the possibility of applying the differentiations.
Having such “facility”, after imagining the possibility of experience on which a concept can be applied, we get to an “abstract” experience, an experience which holds just what we have put in it, holds just the concepts we imagined.
In such way, we can comprehend that “red is color” not just if we have the red color in our immediate experience, but also we can comprehend it any time we imagine the experience in which we can apply (or recognize) “red”. In such way we are aware that in every possible experience in which we will recognize red, it will also be color (in the sense already explained before- concept of color is part of concept of red).
In this way we are becoming aware of facts which are not dependant on any particular experience, but would be true in any experience in which the concept is recognized, but further this kind of facility makes it possible for us to comprehend even non intra-concept relations (like red-color was), but between different concepts.
One example would be the relation between concepts of “louder” and “quieter” sounds. If we imagine an experience with two sounds where the first sound – A is louder then the second sound – B, we are aware also that in same situation it is true that B is quieter then A.
Again, it is not important in which particular experience we learned about the concepts of louder or quieter, as the relation didn’t come from the experience itself, but from our ability to apply differentiations to that experience. After learning those concepts (being aware of their possible applicability), we can reason about them imagining abstract possibility of applying those concepts.
Or we can take the example of numbers. Once we build a concept of “one”, a specific differentiation tree which can be applied in certain experience, the concept of one can be thought and reasoned about by using imagination in abstract way. The same thing is with the concept of “pair” (or two), the concept itself once built (its potentiality actualized in some experience) becomes a concept which can be reasoned about in imagination. And it is because of this that we can comprehend relations like 1+1=2 , relations between concepts that are true in every possible experience in which those concepts can be applied.