There are such concepts like “bigger”, “louder”,
“brighter”,
and other combinations of “more, less, most”, which seem to not have
connection
to sameness, but quite opposite they are concepts which refer to
relation of
some things as “not same”. So how it is possible for those concepts to
be
concepts in the sense of what was postulated previously?
First we can note that similarly
to other concepts those
“relation” concepts can not be sets. The argument is same to what I
used to
argue that concepts can’t be sets in general. The example would be… if
we “get”
(understand) the concept of “louder” we can say that one sound is
louder then
other even we never have heard those sounds or their level of loudness
before.
Same with “higher” for example, if we understand what higher means, we
can
judge not just pairs of heights for which we were told that “A is
higher then
B”, but we can make judgment any two things having height.
Second thing we can note is that
the relations and comparing
is done on the properties of the things which are of “same nature”,
e.g.
“louder” makes sense only when comparing two sounds, “darker” when
comparing
two colors and so on. Some of those words can be used to refer to other
meanings,
but that is outside of the scope of current discussion, and in any case
when
doing relations we would use just one meaning of the word, except in
cases
where we want to do little poetry (e.g. my soul was darker then black)
Now if we have in mind that the
intensity of the certain
differentiation can be controlled, we can postulate a solution for this
issue.
The solution would be that those concepts are not
the
differentiations which are done directly on the cognitive whole (which
we can
call base differentiation), but which are done on the “change of the
intensity
of the base differentiation through the time”.
Let’s say we hear a cognitive context CC1
containing
loud sound, and to determine it we first apply a sound differentiation Ds
with intensity I1 (in fact that would be the only thing
that
determines it as loud). After that we are presented with other
cognitive
context CC2, and for determining the sound we must “increase
the
intensity” of differentiation Ds to the I2.
The both sounds belong to a containing cognitive
context CC,
and in that context we can do additional differentiation Dmore2less
on the change of the intensity of Ds over time in which we
comprehend the two sounds.
This differentiation (Dmore2less)
now hold the
two things needed to be concept for relation: it holds identity based
on the
oneness of the differentiation which can be applied in every comparing
of
loudness of sounds in our experience where the first one is louder then
the
second one, and it is by its nature “relational” differentiation, it
requires also
simultaneous differentiation of the two separate sounds.
Of course Dmore2less
would be just one possible
differentiation, other differentiations would be for “rising
intensity”, “swinging
intensity” and so on.
So if on cognitive context CC containing sounds CC1
and CC2, a differentiation can be applied - Ds
whose
intensity in case of CC1 relatively to the one for CC2
can be differentiated by the “rising intensity” differentiation, we can
say
that sound CC1 is quieter then CC2.
Two additional notes here:
Those differentiation on the intensity
doesn’t have to be simple one like rising and falling, they can be more
complex which would “recognize” circular change of amplitude,
triangular change etc. Also they can result in contexts which can
further be determined on several levels.
It seems that this intensity in
different kind of differentiations is really a scalar (one-dimensional
intensity) value; resulting in possibility of applying of same kind of
differentiation on intensity no matter what kind of context we started
with. This gives possibility to explain concepts like “more”, “less”
etc… which are very general, and can be applied on very different
contexts and qualities.
The “more” and “less” can be used also
to refer to a amount in which one differentiation can be applied
successfully to determine one context. For example it is possible to
compare colors red and magenta and say that the one is “more reddish”
then the other. In the sense of differentiations it can be said that in
the one case the differentiation of red would succeed in totally
determining the color (e.g. if the color is red), and in other case the
differentiation would just partially determine the color (e.g. if the
color is magenta, the differentiation of red would just partially
succeed in abstracting the perception). The differentiation over the
amount of “leftovers” (I would not get in specifying the nature of this
differentiation) in the two differentiations can be used by the
differentiations of more2less or less2more in order to give judgment
that one of the colors is more reddish then the other. Of course this
can be also the meaning of “similar” – the magenta is similar to red,
because the determination which is used for red can be applied to
determine the magenta also, with the difference that it wouldn’t fully
determine it (hold it under its concept)